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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A repair shop does not owe a duty of care to a tow truck driver who is summoned 
to move a vehicle disabled by its repair. The trial court erred when it held a repair shop 
owes such a duty. 
ARGUMENT 
L Sound policy judgment dictates a repair shop owes no duty to a tow truck 
driver. 
A. The facts surrounding this particular accident do not bear on the issue 
of duty 
When it remanded this matter, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for 
determining whether Hansen owe Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. Notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's guidance, plaintiffs argue that when analyzing the duty issue, this case 
involves unique facts and circumstances that justify looking beyond "the abstract 
proposition" of "whether a repair shop owes a duty to a tow truck driver." Appellees' Br. 
at 15 and 16. Although the only issue before this court is a purely legal one—whether a 
duty is owed—plaintiffs cloud the analysis of duty with facts that relate instead to the 
accident. For example, plaintiffs state: 
"Hanson Equipment's negligent repair.. .caused unforeseen torque to 
build up in the truck's drive line." Id. at 1. 
"The negligent repair also caused torque to build up in the drive line." 
Id. at 4. 
"Because of the leak in the hose that Hanson had spliced on, a huge 
amount of torque had built up in the drive line as the truck came to a 
stop." Id. at 9. 
"Hanson's negligent repair.,, caused an excessive amount of torque to 
build up in the drive line." Id. at 13. 
"...Hanson tries to avoid one of the central facts of this case, namely, 
that Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck's hydraulic line did 
not just cause the truck to break down, requiring the services of a tow 
truck driver, but also created the very hazard that killed Mr. 
Normandeau." Id. at 15. 
Because this theme runs throughout plaintiffs' brief, Hanson Equipment needs to 
respond. To be clear, Hanson Equipment assumes on appeal it negligently repaired a 
hose in the hydraulic line for the brakes and power steering, which caused the hydraulic 
line to lose fluid. A picture of where the hose that failed was located under the hood is 
attached in the Addendum, as well as a picture of the driveline underneath the truck. As 
plaintiffs' expert mechanical engineer explains: 
The improper hydraulic line repair by Hansen Equipment directly caused 
that same hydraulic line to spring a leak allowing the escape of hydraulic 
fluid from the line. This loss of hydraulic fluid caused the truck's power 
steering to cease to operate, and also caused the driveline parking brake to 
engage as an emergency measure to stop the truck. The loss of hydraulic 
fluid from the broken hydraulic hose thus disabled the truck, rendering it 
not driveable, and requiring it to be towed. 
Because the truck now had to be towed, the driveline had to be disengaged 
from the rear drive wheels so as not to damage the transmission of the 
truck. That job had to be done by a professional tow truck operator such as 
Dennis Normandeau. 
(R. at 808-809, at ff> and 10.) 
1
 The picture under the hood is Trial Exhibit 12, and the picture underneath the truck is 
Trial Exhibit 7, both of which are included in the Record in the folder labeled Trial 
Exhibits, 1 of 2. 
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In other words, the reason the parking brake engages when a hydraulic system loses 
pressure is because that is how the truck's hydraulic system is designed to operate. 
Torque occurred in the truck's driveline when the parking brake engaged. (R. at 809, 
f 11.) The failure of a hydraulic hose would not cause the parking brake to engage absent 
the manufacturer designing the system to operate in that manner. 
Therefore, it is a stretch for plaintiffs to argue that the negligent repair caused 
unforeseen torque to build up in the driveline or even that torque is a rare or unexpected 
occurrence in drivelines. What is more accurate, and supported by plaintiffs expert in 
the Record, is that the negligent repair caused the hydraulic line to leak fluid, which 
affected the efficacy of the brakes and power steering, and caused the truck's failsafe 
emergency design to engage the parking brake . This is not a situation where special 
circumstances caused torque to build up in the driveline. When the parking brake 
engages, torque naturally occurs, which is why with every professional wrecker is aware 
of torque and must check for and relieve the torque. (R. at 813). 
Although Hansen wanted to clarify the nature of the events, these facts are largely 
irrelevant to whether a duty of care is owed. As the Supreme Court noted, "Foreseeability 
as a factor in determining duty does not relate to the specifics of the alleged tortious 
Plaintiffs expert further explains, "This truck's design has a hydro-boost system where 
both the power steering and power brakes are supplied from a single hydraulic pump. The 
parking brake system also uses hydraulic pressure from the same pump. All three systems, 
that is, brake boost, power steering and parking brake release, utilize the same hydraulic 
fluid, pump and reservoir. A leak in any one of those system components will render the 
vehicle without service brake boost, power steering, or parking brake release." (R. at 
807, H3). 
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conduct but rather to the general relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and the 
victim. Whether a harm was foreseeable in the context of determining duty depends on 
the general foreseeability of such harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm 
could be foreseen." NormandeauII, 2009 UT 44, [^20 (citation omitted). And, although 
"factual issues may bear on the issue of foreseeability as it relates to duty, [Normandeau] 
is not such a case.. ..The court had the undisputed facts necessary to examine the legal 
relationships between the parties and analyze the duties created by these relationships." 
Id. at [^21 (citations omitted). We turn now to the general relationship of the parties and 
the general foreseeability of harm. 
B. The legal relationship of the parties and the foreseeability of harm. 
The attenuated relationship of the parties here favors a finding that no duty of care 
is owed to the tow truck driver. Hanson Equipment incorrectly repaired a hose in a 
vehicle that rendered it inoperable, which required the services of a professional to move 
it to a subsequent repair shop. The wrecker driver's task with this tow was the same as all 
tows of large vehicles—relieve the torque so the driveline can be removed. If this Court 
were to assign a duty here, then it would also have to assign a duty of care to all 
professionals from these who find themselves in need of their services—an extension of 
liability beyond sound public policy. Public policy favors holding tow truck drivers to the 
standard of care required by their profession. A repair shop does not owe a duty to avoid 
creating the need for a tow truck driver. 
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The occupation of a tow truck driver is, by its nature, hazardous. Towers work in 
precarious places under stressful conditions around dangerous equipment. The likelihood 
of injury to a tow truck driver is very low when, as here, a hydraulic line fails and renders 
a truck inoperable. These professionals know how important it is to certain precautions, 
which includes, checking for torque when disassembling drivelines. It is not foreseeable 
to a repair shop or anyone else that a professional would be injured while preparing a 
vehicle for towing. On the other hand, what is generally foreseeable from the negligent 
repair of a hydraulic hose is that the truck will lose power from the hydraulic line and the 
operator will have to navigate the vehicle to safety. In that scenario, the truck operator 
and those in his or her path to safety fall within the realm of foreseeability of harm. 
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson's motion for summary judgment. The 
trial court's ruling failed to recognize the parties attenuated relationship did not warrant 
the imposition of a duty of care. Moreover, the circumstances that brought the parties 
together similarly does not require a duty of care. The trial court's finding of a duty 
conflicts with fundamental policy considerations which weigh against finding those in 
need of professional assistance also owing a duty of care with respect to the professional 
service rendered. 
II. Hanson equipment preserved the issue of whether a duty of care is owed and 
may cite persuasive authority to support its arguments on the issue. 
The professional rescuer doctrine is not an affirmative defense, nor is it an "issue" 
on appeal which must be preserved. Moreover, this doctrine was raised to the trial court 
and addressed in Hanson's docketing statement to this court. Plaintiffs have failed to 
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provide this Court with any authority to support the argument that a party must cite all 
authority to the trial court it intends to use on appeal in order to preserve the authority for 
appeal. As plaintiffs point out in their brief, Hanson Equipment merely argued the 
doctrine was analogous to case at hand and the reasoning underlying the doctrine is 
persuasive on the issue before this court—namely whether Hanson Equipment owed 
Normandeau a duty of care. As persuasive authority on an issue that was timely asserted 
and preserved for appeal, Hanson Equipment can cite to the case and argue why its 
reasoning applies to the issue before this court. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any case 
law, and Hanson Equipment is unaware of any, that would preclude a party from citing 
additional authority in support of an argument that was adequately preserved and argued 
to the trial court. Because Hanson Equipment preserved the issue for appeal, this Court 
should decline plaintiffs' invitation to ignore it and consider whether the reasoning 
underlying the professional rescuer doctrine is applicable to the issue of whether a duty of 
care is owed. 
III. Occasioning the need for a professional is insufficient to impose a duty of care 
when the injury is within the anticipated scope of risks associated with the 
profession. 
Hanson Equipment owed Mr. Normandeau no duty of care when it merely created 
the need for his response in his professional capacity as a tow truck driver. In assessing 
the professional rescuer doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court noted that assigning duties of 
care and tort law are "saturated with judicial policy judgments." See Fordham v. 
Oldroyd, 2007 UT 74, ^4, 171 P.3d 411. In determining whether to impose a duty in 
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Fordham, the Court noted the analysis turned on the following: "(1) whether the injury 
was derived from the negligence that occasioned the professional rescuer's response, and 
(2) whether the injury was within the scope of those risks inherent in the professional 
rescuer's duties." Id. at }^6. This analysis is not all that different from more traditional 
duty of care analysis which looks at "policy judgments applied to relationships." See id. 
at 1f4 (quoting Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,1J17, 143 P.3d 283). 
Accordingly, Hanson Equipment cited this Court to the Fordham decision as persuasive 
authority when applied to the facts of this matter. 
Taking the fects as plaintiffs argue them, this matter does not present a policy 
justification for imposing a duty of care to this highly attenuated relationship. Hanson 
Equipment is a repair shop in Colorado, and Mr. Normandeau was a large wrecker driver 
in Utah. Hanson Equipment's repair created the need for a tow truck. Applying the 
analysis in Fordham to these facts, however, does not support the trial court's conclusion 
that Hanson Equipment owed Mr. Normandeau a duty of care. 
As discussed in Fordham, Hanson Equipment's negligence created the need for 
Mr. Normandeau to be on the scene in order to tow the Ryder truck. Hanson Equipment 
does not understand plaintiffs to be arguing that merely creating the need for a tow truck 
driver automatically creates a duty of care between the parties. Indeed, this position 
would create such a broad rule as to impose virtually limitless duties of care to 
professionals whose job it is to repair broken items. Moreover, such a rule would make 
people in need of professional assistance guarantors of a professional's safety. The social 
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and policy implications of this rule would be too great to impose such a broad duty. 
For example, if a homeowner became angry and kicked a furnace, does the 
homeowner owe the furnace repairman a duty of care when the professional comes to 
repair the furnace? The homeowner occasioned the need for the repair by negligently 
kicking the furnace, causing it to need a repair. Fordham and other cases in Utah such as 
Yazd indicate the homeowner does not owe a duty of care. If the rule were otherwise, 
people would never seek professionals to respond to any situation in which negligence 
occasioned the need for a professional response. 
The second part of Fordham looks at whether the injury was within the scope of 
risks inherent in the professional's duties in response. See Fordham, 2007 UT 74 at ^ J6. 
This issue appears to be the crux of plaintiffs' arguments on appeal. Specifically, 
Normandeaus argue the negligent repair created the torque in the driveline. The presence 
of torque in a truck's driveline, however, is common to tows of all large trucks. Tow 
truck drivers are taught to check for torque. Even Mr. Normandeau's own supervisor, 
Kyle Bundy, and Normandeau's expert witness, Jesse Enriquez, offered opinions about 
the presence of torque. (R. at 620-21; 812-16). Specifically, Mr. Enriquez stated: "It 
appears that Dennis Normandeau was aware of driveline torque and was familiar with the 
process for removing a driveline in preparing a truck for towing." (R. at 813). Mr. Bundy 
taught Mr. Normandeua how to check for and relieve torque (R. at 660, at 25:7-23), and 
Mr. Normandeau towed vehicles with a similar brake system three to five times a month. 
(R. at 621, 666 at 50:21-51:18.) 
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Taking the furnace hypothetical one step further, suppose when the homeowner 
kicks the furnace, the kick causes an electrical wire to become exposed and to electrically 
charge a part in the furnace which under normal circumstances would not be electrified. 
Would this fact cause the homeowner to now owe a duty of care to the repairman who 
was called on scene? If in the furnace repair industry the possibility of electrocution is a 
known and accepted hazard, does this knowledge change the analysis? If because of this 
known hazard the standard practice for a repairman is to turn off the electricity before 
investigating the reason for the repair, does the analysis change yet again? 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this question, and answered it in the negative. 
See Fordham, 2007 UT 74 at [^6. The presence of torque in a truck's driveline is a known 
and accepted risk inherent to tow truck drivers in their profession. Plaintiffs' own expert 
stated that Mr. Normandeau was aware of torque in drivelines. Absent facts to show the 
negligence created a situation outside the normal risks inherent in the profession, the 
person occasioning the need for a professional does not owe a general duty of care. 
Certain industries and professions are inherently dangerous; however, creating the 
need for the profession does not make a person a guarantor of the professional's safety 
when performing the job. Moreover, it does not create a duty of care between the 
professional and the person who needs the professional's service. If the rule were 
otherwise, nobody would enlist the services of professionals for fear of personal liability 
if the professional was inexperienced, lacked specific knowledge, or was harmed by 
known risks associated with the profession. Accordingly, Hanson requests this Court to 
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reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment on the legal issue of 
whether a duty of care is owed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it denied Hanson Equipment's motion for summary 
judgment on the legal issue of whether a duty of care was owed to Mr. Normandeau. The 
relationship of the parties is too attenuated to assign a duty of care, and the injury 
sustained by Mr. Normandeau was highly unlikely and not generally foreseeable. Mr. 
Normandeau responded to a need for his professional services. His injury was caused by 
a risk known to all professionals in his industry. Based on these facts, Hanson Equipment 
was entitled to summary judgment, and this matter should not have been submitted to the 
jury. 
X 
4 < — 
DATED this <^_ day of February, 2010. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
ttorneysfor Defendant Hanson Equipment, Inc. 
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Colin P. King 
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